English · Português
ISSN 0102-8529 (Impresso)
1982-0240 (Online)
PUC-Rio - Página inicial Instituto de Relações Internacionais Revista Contexto Internacional

Vol. 39, N° 1, Jan/Apr, 2017

When and How do Bureaucratic Conflicts Matter in Trade Policy? Evidence from the US Trade Policymaking Process during the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)

Rodrigo Fagundes Cézar


Abstract

The study of the role played by bureaucracies contributed substantively to the analysis of the domestic determinants of foreign policy outcomes, particularly by softening the premise of the state as a unitary-rational actor. However, the potential of focusing on bureaucracies to analyse US trade policy outcomes has been severely underestimated by the most recent IPE scholarship, which tends to focus on the Congress and interest groups, and to consider the Executive a unitary actor. Based on elements of the bureaucratic politics model, this article uses evidence from the US trade policy during Clinton’s administration (1993–2001) in order to present arguments regarding how and when bureaucratic conflicts matter the most, and highlight the relevance of these conflicts in the trade decision-making process.

Keywords: United States; Executive; Trade Policy; Decision-making; Bureaucratic Conflicts

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